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AMENDING THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT: IMPOSING FINANCIAL
BURDENS ON PRISONERS
OVER TAX PAYERS
MALLORY YONTZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Fierce flames stretched their unrelenting claws around the
homes of twelve unsuspecting families on the west side of
Indianapolis in 2001.1 The conflagration consumed twelve
apartments, causing $2 million in damage and leaving twelve
families homeless. This life-altering firestorm would have been a
regrettable accident-but it was no accident. Rather, it was the
intentional act of Eric Smith. 2 Smith was quickly arrested after
the incident and was later charged with arson, convicted, and
sentenced to twenty years in prison.
During his time in prison, Smith came to the startling
realization that his hair was thinning.3 With the very real danger
of baldness looming in the arsonist's future, he made requests to
prison officials for Rogaine. 4 When his requests were denied, he
* Mallory Yontz will receive her J.D. from The John Marshall Law School
in 2012. Special thanks to Judge Paul E. Plunkett and Assistant State's
Attorney Paul Groah for their advice and encouragement with this Comment.
1. Bob Segall, Prisoner Lawsuits Costly to State, 13 INVESTIGATES,
http://www.wthr.com/story/5097630/prisoner-lawsuits-costly-to-state?clien
ttype=printable (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). This article discusses the costly
effect of prison litigation on the state of Indiana's economics. Id. The article
sets the foundation for its argument by illustrating the facts behind the act of
arson that put Eric Smith behind bars, and then pointing out the ridiculous
nature of his lawsuit (premised on denial of Rogaine being a denial of
constitutional rights) by citing his actual complaint. Id. Also, a letter that was
written from Smith to prison officials illustrates the disingenuous attitude and
motive behind his lawsuit. Finally, the article stirs up aggravation in the
average citizen by pointing out the injustice in the fact that it is the taxpayer
who foots the bill for pro se prison plaintiffs who are in their present positions
because they have already committed transgressions against society. Id.
2. Id. The article states that the perpetrator, Eric Smith, was "quickly"
arrested after the incident. There is no mention of consideration of other
suspects that may have been responsible for igniting the fire. Id.
3. Id. It is explained that Eric Smith made requests for Rogaine "to help
his thinning hairline." Id.
4. ROGAINE, http://www.rogaine.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). Rogaine
is a FDA approved treatment that is clinically proven to re-grow hair through
repetitious topical application.
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decided to file a lawsuit.5 Smith claimed that the denial of Rogaine
equated to "cruel and unusual punishment," that "baldness is
causing [him] mental harm, pain, and self-image problems," and
that he has an "inalienable right to obtain hair-loss products."6
Apologies to Mr. Smith, but a search to find access to Rogaine
among the constitutional rights comes up short. While his
baldness may be troubling to him, query whether the twelve
families whose homes were reduced to ash, courtesy of Mr. Smith,
have a slightly more compelling plight. Regardless of the blaringly
inane and downright preposterous nature of Smith's lawsuit, he
was still afforded access to the court system and the State bore the
financial burden of defending his lawsuit.7
Eric Smith is only one of thousands of inmate plaintiffs who
file lawsuits against the State. Although access to the courts is a
cornerstone of American ideology, many prisoners9 are abusing
this right, and they are doing so at the expense of the taxpayers.10
The expense of prison litigation is daunting on its face, but in light

5. Segall, supra note 1. Westerville superintendent Bill Wilson argued,
"Rogaine is not one of Mr. Smith's basic needs, [and] as long as [I am]
providing him with his basic needs, I don't see why we need to provide Mr.
Smith with Rogaine." Id. The article also explains that the Mr. Smith feels his
right to Rogaine is protected under Article 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana
State Constitution. Id. Additionally, Wilson stated that inmates "have a lot of
time on their hands but time is money to us and to the state." Id.
6. Id. at 10, 17-18.
7. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 87
(1991) (explaining that access to the court system is a fundamental right that
has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court as
paramount to the concept of due process of law contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution). Specifically, Palmer argues that the right of
an inmate to exercise this basic constitutional right was established in the
1940 case of Ex parte Hull. Id.

8. See Segall, supra note 1 (explaining that the Attorney General's Office
defends against thousands of prisoner lawsuits).
9. See JOHN BOSTON, THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 1-2 (Sept. 14,

2004), available at www.wnylc.net/pb/docs/plra2ciro4.pdf (explaining that the
term "prisoner" refers to "any person incarcerated or detained in any facility
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,
violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation,
pretrial release, or diversionary program." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2006);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c))). Under the PLRA, military
prisoners are also categorized as prisoners. Marrie v. Nickels, 70 F. Supp. 2d
1252, 1262 (D. Kan. 1999). Those held in private jails are prisoners under the
PLRA as well. Herrera v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (D.
N.M. 2002). Those held in juvenile facilities are also prisoners. Lewis v.
Gagne, 281 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Also categorized as
prisoners are those held in drug rehabilitation centers. Witzke v. Femal, 376
F.3d 744, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2004).
10. See Segall, supra note 1 (quoting deputy attorney general Patricia
Erdmann saying "[p]risoners have a right to use the courts but they don't have
a right to abuse the courts and certainly not at taxpayers'] expense.").
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of the damaged economy that is struggling to stay above water,"
the cost is simply unwarranted and disproportionate to the weight
of prisoners' claims. 12 Although attempts have been made to
rectify this issue, the American judicial system has been mired in
countless frivolous claims brought by inmates for decades, and
perhaps the economic state of the country 3 is just the setting
required to inspire substantial resolution.
Part II of this Comment will supply the background of prison
litigation, detailing how prisoners bring these claims, the volume
in which they bring them, and what has previously been done in
an attempt to curb abusive prison litigation. Part III will present
an economically centered argument addressing the high cost of
litigation juxtaposed with the high frivolity of the suits. Part IV
will propose that the economic burden each prisoner places on the
State to fund the life of their lawsuit should be balanced with a
financial penalty against a prisoner for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
This Comment investigates frivolous prison litigation, its effect on
the state's economy, and explores viable solutions.
II.

BACKGROUND

Prisoners were not always afforded the access to the courts
that they currently enjoy.14 Today, however, prisoners effortlessly

11. See Recession, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/time
stopics/subjects/r/recessionand-depressionlindex.html?scp=4&sq=US%20econ
(last updated Sept. 20, 2010)
omic%20recession%202008&st=Search
(explaining that although there is no widely recognized specific definition of
"recession," the National Bureau of Economic Research defines recession as "a
significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income,
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales."). The Bureau
has come to be accepted as the authority on definitive dates of recessions and
expansions. Id. The National Bureau of Economic Research announced on
December 1, 2008, that the United States economy entered a recession as of
December 1, 2007. Id.
12. See CITIZENS AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, CITIZENS IN CHAINS: THE HIGH
COST OF PRISONER LAWSUITS TO CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS (Aug. 2008),
available at http://www.sdcala.com/programs/calareports/culturereport?tmpl=
component&print=1&page= (explaining that in the midst of the budget crisis
the prison system is one of California's highest expenses). The burden that the
state undertakes as a result of lawsuits filed by prisoners is economically
taxing, worsens the clogging of the court system, and demands special
attention. Id. Also, many of the claims filed by inmates are "minor grievances
at best" and are often lacking in merit altogether. Id.
13. Recession, supra note 11.
14. Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969). The court
referenced its previous treatment of prisoner's claims, stating that:
We have consistently adhered to the so-called 'hands off' policy in
matters of prison administration according to which we have said that
the basic responsibility for the control and management of penal
institutions, including the discipline, treatment, and care of those
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arrive in federal court through Section 1983 of the United States
Code. 15 Section 1983 was actually passed during the post-Civil
War era in 1871 as the first section of the "Ku Klux Klan Act."16 In
essence, Section 198317 allows a person to bring suit against a
person violating their constitutional rights while acting under the
color of state law.' 8
This statute existed for nearly one hundred years before it
was utilized as a means to bring suit against state officials in
1961.19 The practice of utilizing Section 1983 to recover from state
officials stems directly from the Supreme Court's decision in
Monroe v. Pape.20 Three years later, the Supreme Court first
acknowledged that the right to bring suit against state officials
extends to prisoners. In Cooper v. Pate, the Court ruled that
inmates have standing to bring suits in federal court under

confined, lies with the responsible administrative agency and is not
subject to judicial review unless exercised in such a manner as to
constitute clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison officials.
Id.; See also Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights:
Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1998)
(stating that convicted prisoners were once considered slaves of the state who
had no rights, so prison litigation was nonexistent (citing Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871))). In Ruffin, a Virginia court
refused to even hear plaintiffs claim simply based on the fact that he was a
prisoner. Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796. It was not until after the civil rights
movement when the Warren Court eventually conceded that prisoners should
at least have some rights that the Constitution provides. Herman cited supra
at 1229.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
16. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 1-3 (2d ed. 2008).
17. SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 4 (Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 1998).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id.
19. SCHWARTZ, supra note 16, at 1-2.
20. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173 (1961). It articulates that the
purpose of Section 1983 was (1) to "override certain kinds of state laws"; (2) to
provide "a remedy where state law was inadequate"; and (3) "to provide a
federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice." Id. at 173-74. This case was later reversed on other
grounds.
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Section 1983 as a matter of recourse for their grievances. 2'
Common claims brought by prisoners usually fall under the
category of prison conditions 22 and encompass a wide range of
complaints consequently providing the foundation and building
blocks for an onslaught of claims. However, only in the past forty
years have Section 1983 claims transformed from a shield to a
sword. In 1966,23 merely 218 state prisoners petitioned the federal
courts under Section 1983.24 The number of claims grew
exponentially over time, 25 and by 1994 the number of filed suits
swelled to an astonishing 56,000.26 The problem of superfluous
suits was only compounded by liberal judges who took great pains
to investigate the merit and resolution of these claims.27 The
number of prisoners' suits overwhelming the federal court system
and the way in which judges were handling them became the
catalyst for Congress to make changes and enact "corrective"
legislation. 28 This legislation became known as the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter "PLRA" or "the Act"). 2 9
The much-needed PLRA was enacted by Congress in 1996.30

21. See generally Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (reversing the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which had affirmed a dismissal by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois of a state
prisoner's suit against the prison warden under Section 1983).
22. See Boston, supra note 9, at 90 (defining prison conditions as "all
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.").

22. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
23. James E. Robertson, A Saving Construction: How to Read the Physical
Injury Rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
The article states that 1966 was the first year that a "tally" of the number of
suits brought by prisoners under Section 1983 was recorded. Id.
24. HERBERT IRA HANDMAN ASSISTED BY WILLIAM J. FULLER I, THE
RIGHTS OF CONVICTS 55 (1975).
25. Robertson, supra note 23, at 3. Robertson points out that since the
commencement of the tracking of prison litigation statistics, the number of
prisoners' claims has grown exponentially over the years. Id.
26. Id.
27. Barbara Belbot, Report on the PrisonLitigation Reform Act: What Have
the Courts Decided So Far?,84 PRISON J. 290 (2004). The article explains that
Congress was concerned about the way in which federal judges chose to deal
with prison litigation. Id. The judges "intervened in the operation of state
prison systems; ordered extensive, detailed, and costly reforms; and monitored
compliance with court orders for often more than a decade." Id. at 290-91.
28. See id. (explaining that the PLRA responded to two primary concerns of
Congress: (1) high numbers of suits filed by prisoners that "were perceived as
clogging up the courts and costing taxpayers large amounts of money with
frequently frivolous litigation"; and (2) the actions of federal judges involved in
such suits).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 290.
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Critics3 1 note that the Act itself was not privy to the rigorous
debate or discussion that it deserved. 32 Rather, it was passed as a
rider to the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, and did not have
a Judiciary Committee Report or a committee mark-up. 33 In spite
of this, or perhaps because of this, the bill still had its opponents,
who voiced concerns regarding its constitutionality. 34 In fact, even
after it was enacted, opponents maintained that provisions of the
PLRA would be struck down as invalid by the courts. 35
Surprisingly, perhaps, courts did not strike down the provisions, 3 6
and in fact courts have repeatedly upheld the PLRA against
constitutional attacks.3 7
The Act itself has two main objectives: to curtail prisoner
litigation and reduce federal court intervention in state prisons.38
In order to meet these goals, the PLRA includes several provisions
aimed to deter frivolous suits. 39 One such provision, and one of the
most frequently litigated,40 is the requirement that prisoners fully
exhaust the grievance procesS41 that exists within their respective
31. Id. The article indicates that although the Act was passed there were
still members of Congress who opposed it.
32. See Herman, supra note 14, at 1277 (explaining that "[t]he legislative
process leading to the passage of the PLRA was characterized by haste and
lack of any real debate.").
33. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
34. Thomas Julian Butler, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Separation
of Powers Dilemma, 50 ALA. L. REV. 585 (1999).
35. Deborah Decker, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995: Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micromanagement?,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 1275 (1997).
36. See Belbot, supra note 27, at 291 (claiming that based on judicial
behavior since the Act was passed, "it is ... clear that courts will not take the
PLRA to task.").
37. Katherine Bennett & Rolando V. Del Carmen, A Review and Analysis of
PrisonLitigation Reform Court Decisions: Solution or Aggravation? 77 PRISON
JOURNAL 405 (1997); Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's
Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What Congress,
Courts, and CorrectionalOfficials Can Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483
(2001); See also Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational
Basis Test and the Prison Litigation Reform Act's DisparateRestrictions on
Attorney's Fees, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 999 (2001) (stating that the United States
Supreme Court has upheld PLRA provisions in four court cases and has not
struck down any of the PLRA provisions). Also, this practice has extended to
the district and circuit courts where only very few courts have ruled against
the Act. Id.
38. Belbot, supra note 27, at 291. The PLRA is divided into two sections.
39. See id. (stating that the PLRA's provisions "impose financial and other
restrictions on prisoner plaintiffs thereby making it more difficult for them to
file lawsuits under § 1983.").
40. Boston, supra note 9, at 10.
41. Interview with Paul W. Groah, Assistant State's Attorney, Cook
County, Illinois, in Chi., Ill. (Sept. 3, 2010). The grievance process may vary
slightly between different correctional facilities, but it ordinarily consists of
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prisons before they can file a claim in federal court.42 With respect
to this particular provision, the United States Supreme Court has
noted: "Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [PLRA section] § 1997e(a)
to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to
this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and
opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the
initiation of a federal case."43
While this may have been a valiant attempt to resolve judicial
inefficiency, some courts, though not entirely striking down the
provision, have found ways around it.44 Not only do courts find
ways to justify a prisoner's failure to exhaust remedies, 45 but they
have also found it to be an affirmative defense subject to waiver.46
The Second Circuit has also suggested that there may be another
exception in light of possible irreparable harm to the prisoner,4 7
and other courts have applied this view. 48 Perhaps most confusing
for courts is the fact that the statute is frustratingly silent on how
to proceed when the prisoner has not exhausted the grievance
process. 49 The discretion that the courts have instilled in
the prisoner filling out a grievance form detailing her complaint, submitting it,
waiting for a response, and then possibly appealing the response or filing a
new grievance. Id.
42. The grievance process provision provides in pertinent part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
43. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
44. See Boston, supra note 9, at 11 (explaining that the Second Circuit has
held that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional and
accordingly courts may "apply doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling to excuse failure to exhaust." (citing Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
355 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 43334 (2d Cir. 2003))). Further, the Second Circuit has held that "special
circumstances" may also justify a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Boston, supra note 9, at 11.
45. Richardson, 347 F.3d at 433. Where the appellate record was unclear as
to whether administrative remedies had actually been exhausted as the PLRA
requires, the court concluded that "failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is not a jurisdictional predicate . . . ." Id.
46. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 647 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating
that exhaustion of administrative processes is an affirmative defense that is
subject to waiver if it is not adequately preserved by the defense); Randolph v.
Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 n.11 (8th Cir. 2001).
47. Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2001).
48. See Howard v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 518, 533-34 (M.D. La. 2003)
(holding that the prisoner does not have to exhaust administrative remedies
for an appeal when the complaint at issue involves transfer from a corrections
facility to a prison and prison officials wanted to continue with the transfer
regardless of a pending appeal).
49. See Boston, supra note 9, at 17-18 (explaining that most circuits have
consistently held that the statute requires that the exhaustion process occur
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themselves50 with regard to answering this silence tends to negate
the provision altogether.
An additional PLRA provision that significantly affects
frivolous suits is the three strikes provision.5 1 This provision seeks
to limit overzealous inmates who repeatedly bring frivolous suitS52
by limiting their access to courts after bringing three such suits. In
theory, the application of this provision appears straightforward;
in practice, however, its application borders arbitrary.5 3 For
instance, a prisoner may maneuver around this provision if he
earnestly believes that he has not filed a frivolous suit.5 4
The PLRA's mental or emotional injury provision55 has also
caused much confusion for courts.5 6 This provision was intended to
ensure that a prisoner claiming a mental or emotional injury could
not recover compensatory damages unless he could also show that
he sustained some form of physical injury that was the result of
the conduct complained of.57 The actual language58 of the statute
prior to the suit being brought and that failure to do so should result in
dismissal, but again courts have discretion on this matter).
50. Id.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statute provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in
a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility,
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Boston, supra note 9, at 116-17. The article details the complications
that arise when courts decide if a strike should be applied, especially when a
case is dismissed but then the prisoner appeals. Id.; See Adepegba v.
Hammons, No. 95-31249, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 41289, at *14 (5th Cir. 1996)
(suggesting that "[a] dismissal should not count against a petitioner until he
has exhausted or waived his appeals."). Also, there are variations in rulings
with respect to partial dismissals. See Barela v. Variz, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1254,
1259 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that partial dismissal was not to be considered
a strike).
54. Boston, supra note 9, at 122. The article introduces the "breathing
space" principle, which stands for the concept that prisoners will only receive a
strike against them if they knowingly or intentionally file suits that take
advantage of the judicial system. Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) states, "[nlo Federal civil action may be brought by
a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or
emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical
injury." Id.
56. Boston, supra note 9, at 98. The article asserts that the mental and
emotional injury provision of the PLRA is poorly written and is fraught with
confusion. Id.
57. Belbot, supra note 27, at 296. The article explains the meaning behind
the provision. Id. The article then goes on to suggest that this provision could
potentially ban inmates from recovering monetarily for suits claiming
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has been the source of some of the bewilderment, as the very
essence of the provision elicits perplexity; courts have questioned
the exact definition of "mental and emotional injury."5 9 Confusion
regarding the meaning of this provision and its relation to
damages leaves its objective unfulfilled. 60
New financial restrictions were also a part of the PLRA. Prior
to the passage of the PLRA, federal courts had the authority to
permit prisoners to file lawsuits in forma pauperis6 1 as long as
they also filed an affidavit stating that they were unable to pay
costs. 62 The allowance of proceeding in forma pauperis was a
violations such as "denial of mental health care, racial discrimination, denial
of religious freedoms, psychological torture, and retaliation for filing
grievances...." Id.
58. See Boston, supra note 9, at 98 (explaining that the use of the word
"prior" has brought so much confusion in fact that courts altogether ignore it).
Also, an issue of those who bring suit after they are released and thus are no
longer "prisoners" has added problems. Id.
59. See id. at 101 (recognizing that while some courts have failed to answer
what "mental and emotional injury" really refers to, others have answered the
question quite simply by stating that "the term 'mental or emotional injury'
has a well understood meaning as referring to such things as stress, fear, and
depression, and other psychological impacts." (citing Amaker v. Haponik, No.
98 CIV. 2663(JGK), 1999 WL 76798, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999))).
60. See id. at 100 (observing that although courts have held, with respect to
damages, that "compensatory damages for actual injury, nominal, and
punitive damages remain available," this is "nonsense" because the precise
language of the in forma pauperis mental and emotional injury provision of
the PLRA specifically spells out that "[n]o... action may be brought" rather
than "no compensatory damages may be recovered").
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1915; FED. R. APP. P. 24. Black's Law Dictionarydefines "in
forma pauperis"as "[Latin 'in the manner of a pauper'] [i]n the manner of an
indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and courts costs when suing,
a poor person is generally entitled to proceed in forma pauperis."BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 849 (9th ed. 2009). For instance, in many jurisdictions, an
indigent divorce petitioner's filing fee and court costs are waived.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). That section provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may
authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action
or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment
of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the
person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit
shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief
that the person is entitled to redress.
(2) A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a
civil action or proceeding without prepayment of fees or security
therefor, in addition to filing the affidavit filed under paragraph (1),
shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or
institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal,
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the
prisoner is or was confined.
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device that was highly attractive, easily attainable, and
consequently, widely employed by prisoners. 63 When the PLRA
was enacted, it considerably altered the previous law by making in
forma pauperis filing more challenging. 64 In essence, the new
provision of the PLRA required a more substantial showing of
inability to financially support a lawsuit.65 The modifications to
filing in forma pauperis were, in theory, meant to encourage a
prisoner to consider a cost-benefit analysis prior to deciding to
bring action against the State.66 Additionally, the revised financial
restrictions were intended to combat the realization that prisoners
often file suits, in part, to cope with the monotony of prison life
and to pester prison officials.67
The PLRA, though arguably well intentioned, was not a
carefully considered piece of legislation.68 While the Act attempts
to reduce cost and volume of prison litigation, its techniques have
yet to adequately reduce frivolous litigation or save the federal
courts money,69 both of which are crucial given the nature of the
current judicial and economic climates. We must also be cognizant
of the fact that the nature of claims has seen a tremendous

(3) An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court
certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.
Id.
63. See Belbot, supra note 27, at 298 (stating that the "vast majority" of
suits filed by inmates are filed in forma pauperis); See generally Kim Mueller,
Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights Derived from a
Field Research Project in the EasternDistrict of California, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1255 (1995) (describing the process a prisoner goes through in filing a
1983 claim including how to achieve in forma pauperisstatus).
64. See generally Belbot, supra note 27, at 298 (explaining in detail that in
order to proceed in forma pauperis,the prisoner must submit in their affidavit
a list of all the assets they possess and also file a certified copy of their trust
fund account statement covering the six months prior to the filing of the suit).
There is also a new formula, which provides that the costs of filing will be
assessed based on an average of the inmate's trust fund balance and also
explains how the court will come to collect this money. Id.
65. See id. (explaining the process that a prisoner must follow to proceed in
forma pauperis).
66. See id. (explaining the rationale behind the economic details of the new
provision).
67. Eugene J. Kuzinski, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous
Inmate Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361 (1998).
68. See Herman, supra note 14, at 1277 (suggesting that the "legislative
process leading to the passage of the PLRA was characterized by haste and
lack of any real debate.").
69. Id. The article states that, "[iun substance, the Act takes a scattershot
approach" to minimizing prison litigation with respect to cost and volume. Id.
The strategies of the PLRA do not necessarily reduce frivolous litigation, nor
do they necessarily save the federal courts money. Id.
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transformation-the subject of cases circa the 1960s and 1970s 70
drastically differs from that of more modern cases.71 Once
legitimate claims have morphed into outlandish exaggerations,
only embellishing the severity of excessive prison litigation and
further demanding a solution.
III. ARGUMENT
The
of the PLRA have left the judicial system
with a gnawing and inescapable sense of emptiness where
satisfying resolution was so craved; a steady stream of frivolous
prison litigation persists. In 2008, twelve years after the passage
of the PLRA, the State of California conducted an in-depth study
(hereinafter "the California Report" or "the Report") focusing on
the overwhelming burden of costly prison litigation against the
background of a state mired in economic turmoil. 3 Although the
Report concedes that not every single lawsuit filed by a prisoner is
provisionS72

70. See generally United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648 (2d
Cir. 1969) (discussing cases where inmates had established procedural rights
that they were denied). After a conviction for manslaughter in the first degree
and a sentence of ten to twenty years, Smith wished to file suit claiming denial
of equal protection of the laws because he was not provided with his right to
appeal due to the fact that he was an indigent defendant who did not know
and was not informed of his right to prosecute an appeal financed by the state.
Id.; See also Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1969) (addressing
situations where inmates are denied medical care for urgent conditions).
Prisoner Harold Church was incarcerated for three weeks before he died in the
Connecticut State Jail of pulmonary emphysema and intensive
bronchopneumonia. Id. The administrator of his estate brought an action
against four prison officials under Section 1983 for failure to provide medical
care even after officers observed that the prisoner did not look well. Id.;
Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 406 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1968)
(regarding a suit brought by a prisoner who was beaten on his head and back
with billy clubs by prison officials during a routine strip search).
71. See CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the suit filed by a death
row prisoner, convicted of sixteen murders, against an author who published a
study about his case (citing Denny Walsh, Inmate Wins Federal Case; Jury
Directs Folsom Staffers to Pay $39,000 in Punitive Damages, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Nov. 11, 2007)). The prisoner claimed that the publication "smeared his
good name" and "hurt his prospects for future employment" and sought $62
million in damages. Id.
72. The provisions mentioned supra notes 52, 56, and 63 dealing with the
three strikes rule, mental and emotional injury rule, and new financial rules
respectively.
73. See generally CITIZENS, supra note 12 (discussing the effect of costly
and protracted prison litigation on the state of California's overextended
budget illustrated by extensive statistical analysis). The article emphasizes
the argument that frivolous prison litigation intensifies already clogged court
systems and prevents judicial efficiency. Id. The article also makes the point
that the burden of prison litigation is ultimately shouldered by the taxpayers.
Id.
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without merit, 74 it gives substantially more weight to the fact that
"[m]any lawsuits filed by prisoners are minor grievances at best,
which-if they have any merit at all-deserve only modest
payments far less than the state's cost to process the cases." 75
Perhaps one of the more poignant articulations that the
California Report boasts is its assertion that the process of filing
frivolous suits is merely a "hobby" for prisoners.7 6 It may seem odd
that one would consume his time by filing endless lawsuits that
are the antithesis of legitimate claims, yet this odd hobby is a
seemingly pedestrian prisoner practice-normal, commonplace,
and even expected in prison life. It would behoove (and likely
amuse) the reader to consider whether the motivation behind the
following suits is truly founded in righting a wrong and the
American ideal of justice.
Meet James Higgason. He is serving time at the Westville
Correctional Facility.77 While serving time for the crime of
burglary, Higgason assaulted a corrections officer.76 For his
crimes, Higgason is housed in a special unit of the Westville
facility, dubbed the Maximum Control Unit, which houses some of
Westville's most dangerous and violent inmates. 7 9 Inmate
Higgason's claims against the State revolve around his lack of
access to pornographic magazines.80 Higgason's Section 1983
lawsuit alleges that prison officials caused him "pain, suffering,
humiliation, mental anguish, emotional distress and financial
loss"81 in their denial of the requested men's magazines. Another
of Higgason's lawsuits alleged that his civil rights were violated
when he was not permitted to be naked in his cell. 82
It is important to note the resources expended by the State to
74. See id. at 3 (explaining that while some lawsuits are justified, many
others are simply adding to the already clogged judicial system, thereby
standing as a roadblock to justice for others awaiting their day in court).
75. Id.
76. See id. (asserting that "frivolous lawsuits amount to a very expensive
taxpayer funded hobby for prisoners while they await parole.").
77. See generally Bob Segall, State Fights Back Against Frivolous Prisoner
Lawsuits, 13 INVESTIGATES, http://www.wthr.com/Global/story.asp?s=5119003
&clienttype=printable (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (relating the story of
prisoner James Higgason, discussing the subjects of his repeated lawsuits, and
explaining the cost that prisoner lawsuits impose on the state in spite of the
three strikes rule). The article also explains the measures inmates take to
navigate around the three strikes rule (which is incorporated in the PLRA). Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The article states that the Maximum Control Unit of the Westville
Correctional Facility is home to prisoners who are deemed to be the most
"violent and difficult" in the state. Id.
80. See id. (stating that Higgason sued the State claiming that he had a
right to pornographic magazines).
81. Id.
82. Id. Higgason filed another lawsuit while incarcerated claiming the right
to be naked in his cell. Id.
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deal with Higgason's suits. Higgason's right to pornography suit
was eventually dismissed by a magistrate, then appealed, then
defeated again, and then subsequently re-filed, repeatedly.83 This
resulted in the Attorney General's office exhausting time, energy,
and finances in protracted court proceedings. 84 Lawsuits filed by
Higgason are consuming office space over at the Attorney
General's office, where they have several boxes encumbered with
the task of storing his lawsuits-114 suits in total filed in eight
years. 85 One such suit brought by Higgason named 153
defendants.86 Per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 7 153
copies of the complaint had to be made, 153 copies had to be sent
to the defendants via certified mail, and 153 defendants required
legal representation (which would be supplied by the Attorney
General's Office).88 Magistrate Judge Ann Smith Mischler8 9 has
explained that Higgason's lawsuits, despite being dismissed, cost
the state thousands and thousands of dollars.90
Meet John Robert Demos, Jr. Demos was convicted of
burglary and attempted rape.91 A sentence of up to ten years in
prison was imposed for the attempted rape, and a sentence of "up
to life" for the burglary. 92 This left Demos with more than ample
83. Id. Higgason's pornography claim was dismissed, then he appealed, and
then he lost on appeal. Id. He then continued to repeatedly file suit citing the
same cause of action. Id.
84. Id. The Deputy Attorney General, Patricia Erdmann, stated that,
"[e]ven though we successfully defended [the pornography suit], he appealed.
He lost on appeal. He continued to file the same lawsuit over and over and
over again." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Higgason brought one suit against every member of the state
legislature, which is comprised of 153 members. Id.
87. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern notice and process of
service. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 requires that a copy of the complaint
be served upon the defendant. Specifically, Rule 4 states: "A summons must be
served with a copy of the complaint. The plaintiff is responsible for having the
summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and
must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service." Id. Note
that this means, as in the case in the text, that if there are a number of
defendants they must all be served with a copy of the complaint. Id.
88. Id. Sullivan County Magistrate Ann Smith Mischler described the
procedure involved in the execution of a lawsuit with 153 named defendants
as time consuming and redundant. Id.
89. Id. Ann Smith Mischler is the magistrate responsible for dismissing
both Higgason's right to pornography magazines lawsuit and right to be naked
lawsuit. Id.
90. Id. Ms. Mischler explained that mailing, copying, and filing adds up to
thousands of dollars for each lawsuit. Id.
91. Elizabeth Rhodes, Lone Warrior For Justice? - Jailhouse Lawyer's
Filings Brought Special Ruling By Supreme Court, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20,
99
10520&
1991, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.comlarchive/?date=1
slug-1284240.
92. See id. (explaining that a jury found Demos guilty and a judge
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time on his litigious little hands to begin his own personal siege on
judicial efficiency. The several suits filed by inmate Demos allege
violations of his civil rights under Section 1983. Specifically,
Demos alleges that: (1) "his civil rights have been violated because
paper money is no longer backed by silver";93 (2) "as a member of
the Chocktaw Indian tribe, he is entitled to a $15 million
reimbursement for treaties broken in the 1800s"; 94 (3) "as a male,
he is a victim of sex discrimination because the prison system
[would not] ship him to the Washington Corrections Center for
Women";95 and (4) "his rights were abridged when the prison did
not recognize his new name, Anwarr Ibenn Abdul Hakeem
Shabazz."96 Not only did Demos fashion a flagrant display of his
newly found zeal for all avenues legal by petitioning the court to
grant him motions for relief, motions for extraordinary relief,
special affidavits, and personal restraint petitions, 97 but he also
decided to display his legal prowess by appealing to the Supreme
Court of the United States-thirty-two times.98 Meet Scott
Anthony Gomez, Jr. Gomez was convicted of a weapons-related
charge in 2004. After serving out his sentence he was released,
then arrested again for violating his parole, and was sent to
Pueblo County Jail in Colorado. While serving his time, Gomez
attempted to add escape artist to his rap sheet. In his attempt to
repel down the side of the facility using a chain of tied-together
bed sheets, he fell some forty feet and seriously injured himself.
Subsequently, Gomez filed a suit against the sheriff claiming that
the prison had made escape too easy and seeking damages for his
injuries.99 The cases of Higgason, Demos, and Gomez are
illustrative of the nature of many of the frivolous suits filed each

pronounced the sentences for each of the crimes).
93. Id. The article provides a list of the specific allegations that inmate
Demos brought against the prison. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. (explaining that Demos was on his way to becoming one of the
most litigious prisoners in history when he began filing countless motions in
what the article calls "a blizzard of paperwork.").
98. Id. After noting that Demos appealed "one too many times," the article
clarifies by stating that he actually appealed directly to the United States
Supreme Court thirty-two times. Id.
99. DeeDee Correll, Prisoner's Lawsuit Says It Was Too Easy to Escape,
L.A.
TIMES,
Jan.
13,
2008,
http://www.latimes.cominews/print
edition/asection/la-na-jailescapel3janl3,0,1707749.story. Gomez attempted to
escape from his cell on two separate occasions. Id. His first attempt included
pushing up a ceiling tile, making his way through the ventilation system, and
eventually repelling down the side of the building using a rope made from bed
sheets. Id. Two days later, Gomez was discovered and returned to his cell. Id.
His second attempt mirrored his initial strategy but was foiled when his bed
sheet rope failed. Id.
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year by bored and restless prisoners. It is exactly this kind of
00
prison litigation that the California Report investigated.
These frivolous suits could be dismissed as fodder for amusing
anecdotes if they were not also, as the California Report points
out, a major contributing source of economic hardship on the
state.101 The Report actually goes so far as to assert that prison
litigation is one of the "central issues at play" with regard to the
state's budgetary woes.102 The costs associated with prison
litigation can be broken down into three categories: (1) costs
associated with staff within the prisons; (2) costs of obtaining legal
counsel to defend the litigation; and (3) costs associated with any
settlements or judgments. 103 Every business day, prisoners file an
average of two lawsuits.10 4 In order to deal with the staggering
number of lawsuits filed, the California prison system staffs an
average of 126 positions. 0 5 In the 2005-2006 budgetary year alone,
the State of California dished out $15.9 million in settlements and
judgments.106 Between 2000 and 2008, the state paid prisoners
over $89 million in settlements. 1o7 The Report 0 8 asserts that the
09
average cost of prison litigation is $32 million annually.
The economic impact alone is justification for legislation that
limits such litigation. Enter the PLRA. Unfortunately, the
provisions set forth in the Act are not truly effectuating their

100. See generally, CITIZENS, supra note 12 (discussing the high costs of
prison litigation, much of which is frivolous).
101. Recall that most prisoners are filing in forma pauperisand thus they do
not pay for costs related to their suit, but rather the state foots the bill.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Id. at 5. The article breaks down the three major costs that contribute
to the vast expense of prison litigation. Id. With respect to staff within the
prisons, California prisons have actually created an entirely new unit to deal
specifically with cases filed by the prisoners. Id.
104. Id. at 6. The article relied on statistics from an investigation into the
California Public Records, which noted settlement and judgment amounts in
prisoner-related civil suits on a year-to-year basis, case materials filed by
inmates, and documents relating to the costs incurred by various departments
related to hiring of legal counsel. Id.
105. Id. at 10. This figure was arrived at by averaging the number of staffers
employed over the six budgetary years beginning with 2002-2003 and ending
with 2007-2008. The budgetary year 2008-2009 was not included in the
calculation.
106. Id. at 6.
107. Id. The article notes that these settlements are from cases that never
proceeded to the trial phase.
108. It should be cautioned that these statistics are not exemplary of the
nation as a whole, and only represent one state-California. It must be
assumed that if statistics from the fifty states were aggregated, the numbers
would be far higher. California is to be viewed as a model-representative of
the issues that face all states in the country.
109. Id. at 8. The litigation at issue in the study is all litigation initiated by
prisoners.
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purpose.110 Consider the three strikes provision."'l This provision,
on its face, seems as if it would be particularly effectiveespecially considering the fact that many prisoners are repeat
offenders when it comes to filing countless frivolous claims. 112
Surely limiting prisoners to three frivolous suits would cut down
on excessive suits. Unfortunately, the intended impact of this
provision has never materialized because prisoners have found
paths to bypass the provision altogether. 113 Inmates who "strike
out"114 in one jurisdiction simply try their luck in another, where
the judges may be unaware of their previous strikes."15
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has opined that entirely
denying access to the courts, even for prisoners, is improper,1"6 as
restricting judicial access would contradict the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. That being said, another route for
navigating around the three strikes provision is for prisoners to
simply petition the courts to allow them to file again in spite of
striking out.11 7 The bottom line is that prisoners who file frivolous
lawsuits are a determined and persevering breed, and their

110. Segall, supra note 77. The article discusses how the "new law"-the
PLRA-is supposed to help the judicial system deal with excessive numbers of
frivolous claims. Id. However, it points out that even provisions like the three
strikes rule have not stopped prisoners from bringing further suits once they
have struck out. Id. It explains that prisoners have found ways to get around
the provision and continue to file frivolous suits. Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
112. Segall, supra note 77. Recall that this article noted that inmate
Higgason had filed a total of 114 cases in eight years.
113. Interview with J. Paul E. Plunkett, Federal District Court Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 5, 2010). A topic discussed
during the interview was the notion that we cannot completely close the doors
of the courts to inmates. Id. Even in a case where a prisoner has filed a
hundred frivolous suits, the very next one he files may in fact be a legitimate
one, and to bar him from filing suit on that legitimate issue contradicts the
essence of American justice. Id. Consequently, there always has to be a way to
allow prisoners into the courts, even if it means maneuvering around
legislation. Id.
114. Segall, supra note 77. Inmates have begun referring to the rule as the
three strikes rule, meaning you have three strikes and you are out.
115. See id. (explaining that one inmate, Larriante Sumbry, struck out in
the Indiana courts and subsequently decided to file in Arizona, Florida, and
Washington, D.C., where the courts apparently would not have knowledge
about the fact that she had struck out in Indiana).
116. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (proposing the idea that
the Supreme Court does not wish to force silence upon prisoners when it
comes to them attempting to litigate a wholly legitimate claim on their own
behalf).
117. Plunkett, supra note 113. Judge Plunkett explained that a prisoner is
always afforded the right to ask the court to hear her claim, despite the
number of strikes, pursuant to the theory that at some point there is a
possibility that she may have a legitimate claim that is deserving of judicial
resolution. Id.
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circumstances of incarceration afford them the opportunity to
devote these characteristics to prison litigation at the expense of
taxpayers.
The prison environment, where numerous convicts are
confined in limited space, is a prime setting for legal experiences
to be exchanged.1 18 Prisoners coach one another as to how to
artfully design a suit that, although it will not necessarily proceed
to trial, may force the State to settle with them/9 The process is
greatly appealing because even frivolous suits can yield monetary
gain for a prisoner. In the event that a prisoner files a frivolous
suit completely without merit, he or she may still end up with a
monetary settlement if it will be more costly for the State to
continue to pursue the case than to settle. 120 This is the prisoners'
strategy and they are not ashamed to concede that fact. 121 For
example, Prisoner Demos1 22 spoke poignantly about prisoners'
seeming obsession and preoccupation with prison litigation. He
has said, "[tihe law isn't just something I do while in [prison]. The
law is something you live, sleep, and eat."123 Now recall inmate
Smith.124 He is quite candid with respect to his attitude and plan
regarding his time in prison. Smith's handwritten letter to the
Attorney General summarizes the prisoner's wanton intent:

118. Groah, supra note 41. Groah explained the kind of dialogue that
prisoners routinely engage in. Id. They share stories of suits they have filed,
the progression of the suits, and any money they receive in settlements. Id.
This behavior encourages fellow inmates to act similarly in the hope that they
will receive money too, regardless of the merits of their claims. Id.
119. Id. Often the nature of the suit is one that will end in dismissal, yet it
still requires funds from the state to get to that point. Id. In many cases, a
settlement conference will ensue and the prisoner will be offered a sum of
money to drop the suit. Id. Even if a suit would not have won on the merits in
court, and the prisoner plaintiff would not have been able to recover monetary
damages, the cost of continuing to fight the suit (various filings, depositions,
etc.) will be more costly than settling for a nominal sum. Id. Consequently, the
state ends up spending money just to get the suit to go away, and the prisoner
still ends up with money for a claim that had a real value of zero. Id.
120. Plunkett, supra note 113.
121. Groah, supra note 41. Being that all of the prisoners are at least
somewhat familiar with the judicial system, since their current situation
resulted from exposure to it, they have at least a minimal understanding of
how it works. Id. That, coupled with stories exchanged between inmates,
makes them feel entitled to "play" the system. Id.
122. Demos is mentioned earlier in this Comment. Rhodes, supra note 91.
After being convicted for burglary and attempted rape, Demos filed a series of
suits ranging from alleging his civil rights were violated because paper money
is no longer backed by silver to arguing his rights were abridged when the
prison didn't recognize his new name, Anwarr Ibenn Abdul Hakeem Shabazz.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Smith was convicted for arson. His story is discussed in detail supra
Part I of this Comment.
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HA HA! I'm costing the DOC and tax payers all kinds of money! You
guys wanna keep me in prison? Fine! ... I'm gonna make sure that
I'm a costly prisoner ... and by the time this 20 years adds up and
is over with, I'm gonna cost all of you THOUSANDS and
THOUSANDS of dollars! HA HA! There's nothing that you can
do.125
Perhaps the California Report should actually substitute its
use of the word "hobby" for the more appropriate term: game.
Therein lies one of the biggest issues. Filing frivolous prison
litigation is just a gamel 26 to inmates who have nothing to lose and
only financial aid to gain. The attitude of the litigious prisoner has
altogether spoiled the original concept of prison litigation.
Consider why prisoners are even afforded the right to file
claims in court with respect to their conditions of confinement.127
Legitimate claims still exist.128 Not only do the frivolous claims

125. The full text of Eric Smith's letter to the Attorney General is as follows:
Dear Ms. Isenberg:
HA!HA! I'm costing the DOC and tax payers all kinds of money! You
guys wanna keep me in prison? Fine! I have no place to go! Why do you
think I'm in credit class 3? In here, I get fed for free! HA HA! There's
nothing you can do, and since you guys wanna keep me in here for a
crime (arson) that I did not commit, I'm gonna make sure that I'm a
costly prisoner-legal copies, legal postage, medication, the Indiana
Attorney General's time and expenses-EVERYTHING! Even
destroying state property in here, and making your guards mace me and
shoot me with pepper balls! It all adds up, and by the time this 20 years
adds up and is over with, I'm gonna cost all of you THOUSANDS AND
THOUSANDS of dollars! Do 20 years for something I didn't do? For a
first-time found conviction? Oh yeah! It's gonna cost all of you as much
as I can. Do you really think I care about being free? Do you really think
conduct reports scare me? HA HA! My life is over with!
Segall, supra note 1.
126. Groah, supra note 41. Mr. Groah routinely deposes inmates who have
filed conditions of confinement claims. Many of the depositions are related to
frivolous suits that are eventually settled. After one deposition, upon being
asked by Mr. Groah why he filed such a seemingly frivolous suit, the inmate
responded by explaining that it was all a "game" and he was just playing it. Id.
He explained that the State's Attorney has his role and the prisoners have
theirs. Id.
127. Porter, 534 U.S. at 532. The Court states that suits pertaining to
"prison conditions" include "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
excessive force or some other wrong." Id.
128. There are prisoner's suits that do warrant litigation. For example, while
prison officials maintain general discretion over the running of prison
facilities, their discretion is not so broad as to include maintaining a facility
that is unfit for human habitation. PALMER, supra note 8, at 224. If the
conditions of a prisoner's confinement are so abhorrent that they rise to the
level of subhuman, then he is entitled to bring a suit to correct this injustice.
Id. Additionally, prisoners are entitled to bring suit against prison officials for
failure to provide timely and/or adequate medical care. Id. at 162. Another
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stall already overwhelmed courts, but they also prevent legitimate
29
while
claims from reaching the judicial resolution they deserve
heavily burdening taxpayers. As the system currently operates,
there are no real consequences for frivolous filings. Prisoners who
once appropriately utilized constitutionally protected access to
courts now play an unacceptable game with tax dollars.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Money speaks. Money can be the catalyst to action or,
conversely, an obstacle that spawns inaction. Money can be a
motivator or a deterrent. It is arguably the single most powerful
and influential entity in existence. Perhaps this is the reason
behind the implementation of fines for or taxes on undesirable or
unsavory behaviors. Consider President Obama's recent tax on
cigarettes, 130 or fines for speeding. 13 1 If you do not want someone to
do something, chances are hitting him where it hurts-his pocket
book-will likely prove to be an effective deterrent. At the very
least, a financial burden will induce consideration before action. It
is precisely this contemplation of human behavior, as it
corresponds to personal economics, which is the foundation for the
solution to excessive frivolous prison litigation. If a financial
burden is placed on prisoners who bring frivolous suits by way of
an amendment to the PLRA, their zeal for filing will likely be
reduced to only those suits that boast legitimate claims. It is
proposed that if a prisoner files a frivolous suit, he or she should
be subject to a monetary penalty in the form of a deduction of a set
legitimate claim may be use of excessive force by prison officials against a
prisoner. Groah, supra note 41.
129. See CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that if frivolous suits were
eliminated from the judicial system, legitimate claims would have better
access to justice).
130. Single Largest Cigarette Tax Hike Goes Into Effect on Wednesday,
FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/29/sin
gle-largest-cigarette-tax-hike-goes-effect-wednesday/. The news article reports
on the new tax that the Obama Administration proposed and signed into law.
Id. The new tax would increase the rate from thirty cents per pack to one
dollar and one cent per pack. Id. Monetary incentives are extremely powerful
and this is demonstrated in the context of an addictive vice like cigarette
smoking. The article quotes long time smokers who claimed that the tax would
stop them from smoking. Id. It speaks to the power of monetary incentives
that a seventy-one cent increase per pack would be enough to make long time,
addicted smokers consider taking on the difficult task of ending their
addictions. Id.
131. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189.394 (West 2011). This speeding statute in
Kentucky is titled: Fines for speeding; doubling of fines in highway work
zones; highway work zone safety fund; doubling of fines in school areas with
flashing lights. Id. Just like many other states, fines are imposed for speeding
and may vary depending upon the number of miles over the speed limit the
driver is traveling at as well as the type of street that the infraction occurs on.
Id.
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percentage of his prison account balance.
When a person becomes a prisoner, a personal account may be
set up in his name to manage money he earns and spends while in
prison. 132 These accounts, referred to as commissary or canteen
accounts,133 are funded in three primary ways. First, when a
prisoner is arrested, any money on his person at the time of the
arrest will be credited to an account.134 Second, friends or family
members may also contribute funds to the prisoner's account.135
Finally, money that is earned through jobs obtained during
incarceration is deposited into the account. 36 Many prisoners seek
employment while incarcerated and several states have programs
dedicated to employing prisoners. 3 7
The money in accounts can be used to purchase a variety of
items from the commissary including toothpaste or even candy
bars, 38 but money is also deducted from the account if the
prisoner has any legal dependants. 3 9 In fact, even if the prisoner
132. States have individual statutes that establish and regulate prisoner
accounts. One such statute is § 441.135, titled: Canteen for prisoners; books of
accounts; allowable expenditures; jail canteen account balance; calculation.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.135 (2007). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) The jailer may maintain a canteen for the benefit of prisoners lodged
in the jail and may assign such jail employees and prisoners to operate
the canteen as are necessary for efficient operation.
(2) All profits from the canteen shall be used for the benefit and to
enhance the well-being of the prisoners. The jailer shall keep books of
accounts of all receipts and disbursements from the canteen and shall
annually report to the county treasurer on the canteen account.
(3) Allowable expenditures from a canteen account shall include but not
be limited to recreational, vocational, and medical purposes.
Id.
133. Groah, supra note 41. Different sources label the accounts differently,
but they are usually referred to as commissary or canteen accounts. Id.
134. See Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., 501 F.3d 726, 729 (6th Cir. 2007)
(discussing a person being arrested with $128 on him at the time of arrest,
and stating that this amount was later credited to his canteen account).
135. See id. at 728-29 (explaining further that friends or relatives may
contribute to an inmate's account by way of money order or credit card).
136. See 57 OKLA. STAT. § 549 (2011) (detailing, inter alia, how inmates'
wages shall be placed in their accounts and may be spent on a variety of
things ranging from personal items to law suit filing fees).
137. County Jail Industry Programs, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5147.30(d)
(2004). This section establishes a program for employment of prisoners and
states that is designed to seek and provide employment for as many prisoners
as possible. Id.
138. Groah, supra note 41. Mr. Groah explained how many prisoners utilize
funds in their commissary accounts. Id. He even provided a copy of an
itemized list of the commissary deductions of one prisoner, which resembled a
bank statement for a checking account. Id. Most of the deductions were small
amounts, not usually more than a couple of dollars. Id.
139. 57 OKL. STAT. ANN. § 549(A)(5). This part of the statute specifically
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does not have enough money in the account to cover such costs,
funds may nevertheless be deducted from the account, in some
cases leaving it with a negative balance. 140 It has been provided by
some states that in this event, "[i]f funds become available or if the
prisoner reenters the jail at a later date, the fees may be deducted
from the prisoner's . . . canteen account."141 Prisoners have an
incentive to maintain a positive balance in their accounts so that
they may purchase desired items while incarcerated, and also
because they are paid the balance upon their release.142
Due to the fact that prisoners' accounts, similar to ordinary
citizens' bank accounts, have varying balances, it would be
unproductive to impose a standard fine1 43 on prisoners for filing
frivolous suits. What would prove to be a major deterrent to one
inmate may only be a minor inconvenience to another, thus
undermining the proposal. For this reason, a set percentage of an
inmate's account should be deducted rather than a set amount.
Because the balance of any given account is naturally subject to
fluctuation (or may even become negative), the percentage should
be determined based on the average of the prisoner's account
balance over the aggregate 44 time of imprisonment. This should
also circumvent possible problems associated with a prisoner
draining her account in anticipation of frivolous filing.
In order to effectuate this proposal, adequate notice must be
supplied to prisoners. The question of how to notify prisoners of an
amendment to the PLRA that potentially will have a great effect
on their litigious behavior is not a difficult one to answer. There is
states that wages deposited into the account may be used for the inmate's
personal use or to cover costs he is obligated to pay for legal dependants. Id.
This includes child support or spousal maintenance.
140. See KY. REV. STAT. § 441.265 (2000) (giving details as to how a prisoner
may reimburse the jail for expenses incurred during his incarceration). Section
6 of the statute provides:
Payment of any required fees may be automatically deducted from the
prisoner's property or canteen account. If the prisoner has no funds in
his account, a deduction may be made creating a negative balance. If
funds become available or if the prisoner reenters the jail at a later date,
the fees may be deducted from the prisoner's property or canteen
account.

Id.
141. 57 OKL. STAT. ANN. § 549. This seems particularly appropriate bearing
in mind that many prisoners have rap sheets with multiple entries and often
rotate through the revolving prison doors.
142. Id. § 549(A)(5).
143. A "standard fine" is meant to mean a single monetary amount, fifty
dollars for example, written into the text of the amendment that would apply
to all prisoners regardless of their account balances.
144. To ensure optimum benefit, "aggregate" should mean any and all time
spent incarcerated-the sum of time spent in prison even if that means adding
time spent for multiple sentences. This only seems logical given that many
prisoners serve time for multiple offenses over their lifetimes.
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one place that every prisoner has an incredibly high likelihood of
visiting before he files suit-the law library. The Supreme Court
has taken an affirmative stance concerning the duty of prison
officials to provide adequate sources of legal knowledge; this
ordinarily takes the form of a law library. 145 In order to draft
pleadings and concoct their cases, most prisoners will consult the
law library. Accordingly, signage posted at the entrance to (and
perhaps throughout) the law library would serve to provide
adequate notice to prisoners of the monetary penalty amendment
to the PLRA and would also act as a constant reminder of the
consequences of frivolous filing.
While imposing a financial burden may seem harsh or like it
may come into conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, it is
actually a common practice for judges to impose monetary
sanctions on uncooperative or misbehaving parties to a lawsuit. 146
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make this
completely within a judge's power, thus circumventing Equal
Protection concerns. 147 However, it is at the judge's discretion to
decide the extent of the sanction, and judges rarely impose
monetary sanctions on prisoners. 148 With an amendment to the
PLRA that provides guidance and instruction as to how to
implement such a sanction, it is probable that judges would begin
to fully utilize the power of Rule 11 with respect to prison
litigation.
It is not uncommon for the "profits" of a monetary sanction to
be used to cover the legal costs of the non-offending party.149
145. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1997). In this case the court held
that prison authorities were responsible for providing legal materials to
inmates. Id. Although the court did not specifically require a law library, it
stated that a viable source of legal knowledge needed to be made available to
inmates in order to ensure their constitutionally protected rights of access to
the courts. Id. at 828-30.
146. Plunkett, supra note 113.
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Rule provides in pertinent part: "If, after notice
and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b)
has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the
violation." Id. The part of Section 11(b) that pertains to this Comment states,
"the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a non-frivolous argument ..... Id.
148. Plunkett, supra note 113. Often, judges will impose sanctions on a party
that will require the misbehaving party to cover the costs of the other party.
Id. Because these costs would be above and beyond what an ordinary prisoner
would be capable of paying, judges usually do not place monetary sanctions on
prisoners. Id.
149. Id. Judge Plunkett further explained that it is also at the discretion of
the judge to decide where the funds from the sanctions will go or how they will
be applied. Id. Judge Plunkett noted that based upon his experience, it is
unlikely that a prisoner will be able to cover all costs of the opposing party, as
the amount is typically quite high. Id.
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However, it would be impractical for a judge to impose monetary
sanctions on prisoners that would force them to pay the legal costs
of the opposing parties, as that amount would likely be far beyond
their economic resources. 50 Instead, the money from this
sanction-the percentage from their prison accounts-should be
transferred to the defending party. In the case of prison litigation
brought under Section 1983, the defending party is the
government. 15 1 In effect, this way of apportioning the money will
do a service to the government and alleviate some of the economic
strain that frivolous prison litigation creates for the State.
The incentive for prisoners who file frivolous claims does not
seem to be resolution 52 of their problems, but rather financial
gain. An amendment to the PLRA that would impose a monetary
penalty for filing frivolous suits threatens a consequence that is in
complete contradiction to their primary goals. This contradiction
hints that an amendment sounding in economic burden on the
prisoner, rather than the State, will prove a successful deterrent.
V.

CONCLUSION

Frivolous prison litigation has been flooding the judicial
system and simultaneously draining government resources since
the 1960s without an adequate plug to slow the flow. The menace
of excessive prison litigation was recognized by Congress as a
legitimate problem in need of resolution, but the shoddy passage of
the PLRA has quite obviously not done enough to curb the
exponentially growing predicament. Despite the arguably wellintentioned barriers of the PLRA, frivolous claims continue to
plague the system.
The current economic state of the country simply cannot
withstand any undue financial hardship. The government simply
cannot afford to pass up the opportunity to cut some of the costs
that come with defending against frivolous suits, both by deterring
prisoners from originally initiating them and putting money back
into the government's hands when prisoners do insist on
proceeding with unfounded claims.

150. Id. The judge also noted that in his experience most commissary
accounts present balances of between twenty-five and a few hundred dollars.
Id.
151. Recall that many of the actions brought under Section 1983 name
prison officials or the sheriff (or both for that matter) as defendants. These
types of defendants will be defended by a government entity such as the
State's Attorney's Office.
152. Recall the story of Scott Anthony Gomez Jr. Supra, note 99. It seems
highly unlikely that his true aim in filing his lawsuit against the prison was to
increase prison facility security-which was the underlying theme to his suit.
Far from wanting more secure ceiling tiles and heightened security, Gomez
sought monetary compensation.

